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Abstract
Preserving privacy of continuous and/or high-dimensional data such as images, videos and
audios, can be challenging with syntactic anonymization methods which are designed for
discrete attributes. Differentially privacy, which uses a more rigorous definition of privacy
loss, has shown more success in sanitizing continuous data. However, both syntactic and
differential privacy are susceptible to inference attacks, i.e., an adversary can accurately
infer sensitive attributes from sanitized data. The paper proposes a novel filter-based
mechanism which preserves privacy of continuous and high-dimensional attributes against
inference attacks. Finding the optimal utility-privacy tradeoff is formulated as a min-diff-
max optimization problem. The paper provides an ERM-like analysis of the generalization
error and also a practical algorithm to perform minimax optimization. In addition, the
paper proposes a noisy minimax filter which combines minimax filter and differentially-
private mechanism. Advantages of the method over purely noisy mechanisms is explained
and demonstrated with examples. Experiments with several real-world tasks including
facial expression classification, speech emotion classification, and activity classification from
motion, show that the minimax filter can simultaneously achieve similar or higher target
task accuracy and lower inference accuracy, often significantly lower than previous methods.
Keywords: inference attack, empirical risk minimization, minimax optimization, differ-
ential privacy, k-anonymity
1. Introduction
Privacy is an important issue when data collected from or related to individuals are analyzed
and released to a third party. In response to growing privacy concerns, various methods for
privacy-preserving data publishing have been proposed (see Fung et al. 2010 for a review.)
Syntactic anonymization methods, such as k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) and l-diversity
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2007) focus on anonymization of quasi-identifiers and protection of
sensitive attributes in static databases. However, it is known that syntactic anonymization
is susceptible to several types of attacks such as the DeFinetti attack (Kifer, 2009). An ad-
versary may be able to accurately infer sensitive attributes of individuals from insensitive,
sanitized attributes. High-dimensional data also poses a challenge for syntactic anonymiza-
tion methods. For example, k-anonymity is known to be ineffective for high-dimensional
sparse databases (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008). In addition, syntactic anonymization
methods are designed with discrete attributes in mind. However, continuous attributes such
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as videos, images, or audios cannot be discretized by binning or clustering without loss of in-
formation. Besides, conventional categorization of attributes as identifiers, quasi-identifiers,
or sensitive information becomes ambiguous with multimedia-type data. For example, an
image can be an identifier if it contains the face of the data owner. However, even if the
face is blurred, other attributes considered sensitive by the owner such as gender or race
can still be recognizable. Furthermore, identifying or sensitive information can be revealed
through correlation with other information such as the background or other people in the
scene.
Differential privacy (Dwork and Nissim, 2004; Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork, 2006) was
proposed to address many weaknesses of syntactic methods (see the discussion by Clifton
and Tassa 2013.) Differential privacy has a more formal privacy guarantee than that of
syntactic methods, and is applicable to many problems beyond database release (Dwork
et al., 2014). In particular, differential privacy can be defined for continuous and/or high-
dimensional attributes as well as for functions (Hall et al., 2013). However, similarly to
syntactic anonymization, differential privacy is not immune to inference attacks (Cormode,
2011), as differentially privacy only prevents an adversary from gaining additional knowledge
by inclusion/exclusion of a subject (Dwork et al., 2014), and not from gaining knowledge
from released data itself. Therefore, an adversary may still guess sensitive attributes of
subjects from differentially-private attributes with confidence.
To preserve privacy of continuous high dimensional data from inference attacks, this pa-
per proposes an approach which differs significantly from previous syntactic or differentially-
private approaches. Consider a scenario where a social media user wants to obfuscate all
faces in her picture with minimal distortion before posting the picture online. The obfus-
cation mechanism proposed in the paper is a type of filtering of the original features by
a non-invertible transformation. How to choose an optimal filter is explained in the fol-
lowing general description. Once the filtered data (e.g., obfuscated pictures) are released,
an adversary will try to infer sensitive or identifying attributes from the data in particular
using machine learning predictors. Therefore the data owner needs a filter that can mini-
mize the maximum accuracy that any adversary may achieve in predicting the sensitive or
identifying attributes. This is an instance of minimax games between the data owner and
the adversary. The privacy of filtered data is measured by the expected risk of adversarial
algorithms on specific inference tasks such as identification. However, if privacy is the only
goal, near-perfect privacy is achievable with a simple mechanism that sends no or garbage
data, which has no utility for any party. To avoid those trivial solutions, (dis)utility of
filtered data needs to be considered as the second goal. Disutility can be measured by the
amount of distortion of the original data after filtering. Alternatively, if there are particular
tasks of interest to be performed on the data by non-adversarial analysts, then again the
expected risk of the target tasks can be used as disutility. The two goals—achieving pri-
vacy and utility—are often mutually conflicting, and finding an optimal tradeoff between
the two is a central question in privacy research (see Related work.) This paper proposes
to minimize the difference of two risks by the minimax optimization of (7). The solution to
the optimization problem will be referred to as minimax filter. In the literature, several
methods have been used to solve continuous minimax optimization problems, including the
method by Kiwiel (1987) used in Hamm (2015). The paper uses a simpler optimization
method based on the classic theorem of Danskin (1967).
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A notable assumption this paper makes is that the training data for computing an
optimal filter are independent of the test data. For example, there are publicly available
data sets that can be used to compute minimax filters such as those from the UCI data
repository.1 As the training data set is already public information, the paper considers only
the privacy of the subjects who use the filter at test time. A similar assumption was made in
Hamm et al. (2016) for knowledge transfer purposes. After the filter is learned from training
data, a new test subject can use the filter to obfuscate her data by herself without requiring
a third party to collect and process her raw data. Note that this setting is analogous to the
setting of local differential privacy (Duchi et al., 2013) where the entity that collects data is
not trusted. Since the training procedure can only access empirical risks, the performance
of the filter on test data is given in the form of expectation/probability. The paper presents
an analysis of generalization error for empirical minimax optimizers in analogy with the
analysis of empirical risk minimizers (ERM).
The goal of minimax filter is to prevent inference attacks, and its privacy guarantee
is quite different from those of other privacy mechanisms. It is task-dependent and is
given in probability or expectation rather than given absolutely, which may be considered
weaker than other privacy criteria such as differential privacy. Furthermore, the sanitized
data whose sensitive information is filtered out may become unsafe in the future if people’s
perception of which attribute is sensitive changes over time. Since the goal of minimax
filter and the goal of differential privacy are very different, it is natural to ask if the two
methods can be combined to take advantages of both methods. Consequently, this paper
presents an extension of minimax filter called noisy minimax filter, which combines
the filter with additive noise mechanism to satisfy the differential privacy criterion. Two
methods of combination—preprocessing and postprocessing—are proposed (see Fig. 2.) In
the preprocessing approach, minimax filter is applied before perturbation to reduce the
sensitivity of transformed data, so that the same level of differential privacy is achieved
with less noise. Similar ideas have been utilized before, where data are transformed by
Discrete Fourier Transform (Rastogi and Nath, 2010) and by Wavelet Transform (Xiao
et al., 2011) before noise is added. In the postprocessing approach, minimax filter is applied
after perturbation, and its performance is compared with the preprocessing approach.
Minimax filter and its extensions are evaluated with several real-world tasks includ-
ing facial expression classification, speech emotion classification, and activity classification
from motion. Experiments show that publicly available continuous and high-dimensional
data sets are surprisingly susceptible to subject identification attacks, and that minimax
filters can reduce the privacy risks to near chance levels without sacrificing utility much.
Experiments with noisy minimax filter also yield intuitive results. Differential privacy and
resilience to inference attack are indeed different goals, such that using differentially pri-
vate mechanism alone to achieve the latter requires a large amount of noise that destroys
utility of data. In contrast, minimax filters can suppress inference attack with little loss
of utility with or without perturbation. Therefore, adding a small amount of noise to the
minimax filter can provide a formal differential privacy to a degree and also high on-average
task-dependent utility and privacy against inference attacks.
To summarize, the paper has the following contributions.
1. http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/
3
• The paper proposes a novel filtering approach which preserves privacy of continuous
and high-dimensional attributes against inference attacks. This mechanism is different
from previous mechanisms in many ways; in particular, it is a learning-based approach
and is task-dependent.
• The paper measures utility and privacy by expected risks, and formulates the utility-
privacy tradeoff as a min-diff-max optimization problem. The paper provides an
ERM-like analysis of the generalization performance of empirical optimizers.
• The paper presents a practical algorithm which can find minimax filters for a broad
family of filters and losses/classifiers. The proposed optimization algorithm and sup-
porting classes can be found on the open-source repository.2
• The paper proposes preprocessing and postprocessing approaches to combine minimax
filter with noisy mechanisms. The resulting combination can achieve resilience to
inference attacks and differential privacy at the same time.
• The paper evaluates proposed algorithms on real-world tasks and compares them with
representative algorithms from the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 presents related work in the liter-
ature. Sec. 3 presents minimax filters and analyzes its generalization performance on test
data. Sec. 4 explains the difficulty of solving general minimax problems, and present a
simple alternating optimization algorithm. Sec. 5 presents noisy minimax filters and two
types of perturbation by additive noise. Sec. 6 evaluates minimax filters with three data
sets compared to non-minimax approaches and also evaluates noisy minimax filters under
various conditions. Sec. 7 concludes the paper with discussions.
2. Related work
Optimal utility-privacy tradeoff is one of the main goals in privacy research. Utility-privacy
tradeoff has particularly been well-studied under differential privacy assumptions (Dwork
and Nissim, 2004; Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork, 2006), in the context of the statistical estima-
tion (Smith, 2011; Alvim et al., 2012; Duchi et al., 2013) and learnability (Kasiviswanathan
et al., 2011). Other measures of privacy and utility were also proposed. Information-
theoretic quantities were proposed by Sankar et al. (2010); Rebollo-Monedero et al. (2010);
du Pin Calmon and Fawaz (2012) who analyzed privacy in terms of the rate-distortion
theory in communication. One problem with using mutual information or related quantity
is that it is difficult to estimate mutual information of high-dimensional and continuous
variables in practice without assuming a simple distribution. In contrast, this paper pro-
poses to use classification or regression risks to measure privacy and utility, which is directly
computable from data without making assumptions on the distribution. Regarding the use
of risks in this paper, classification error-based quantities have been suggested in the liter-
ature (Iyengar, 2002; Brickell and Shmatikov, 2008; Li and Li, 2009). However, privacy in
those works is measured either by syntactic anonymity or probabilistic divergence which are
mainly suitable for discrete attributes. In this paper, privacy and utility are both defined
using risks and are therefore directly comparable when defining the tradeoff of the two. Fur-
thermore, the proposed method explicitly preserves privacy against inference attacks, which
2. https://github.com/jihunhamm/MinimaxFilter
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both syntactic and differentially-private methods are known to be susceptible to (Cormode,
2011).
Most of the aforementioned works focused on the analyses of utility-privacy tradeoff
using different measures and assumptions. Few studied efficient algorithms to actively find
optimal tradeoff which this paper aims to do. For discrete variables, Krause and Horvitz
(2008) showed the NP-hardness of optimal utility-privacy tradeoff in discrete attribute se-
lection, and demonstrated near-optimality of greedy selection. In particular, they used a
weighted difference of utility and privacy cost as the joint cost similar to this work. Ghosh
et al. (2009) proposed geometric mechanism and linear programming to achieve near-optimal
utility for unknown users. Note that the optimization problems with discrete distributions
are quite different from the problems involving high-dimensional and/or continuous distri-
butions.
Algorithms for preserving privacy of high-dimensional face images has been proposed
previously. Newton et al. (2005) applied k-anonymity to images; Enev et al. (2012) proposed
to learn a linear filter using Partial Least Squares to reduce the covariance between filtered
data and private labels; Whitehill and Movellan (2012) also proposed a linear filter using the
log-ratio of the Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Analysis metrics. Xu et al. (2017) presented a
related method of preserving privacy of linear predictors using the Augmented Fractional
Knapsack algorithm. This paper differs from these in several aspects: it is not limited to
linear filters and is applicable to arbitrary differentiable nonlinear filters such as multilayer
neural networks; it directly optimizes the utility-privacy risk instead of optimizing heuristic
criteria such as covariance differences or LDA log-ratios.
The noisy minimax filter proposed in Sec. 5 bears a resemblance to the work of Rastogi
and Nath (2010) and Xiao et al. (2011). Rastogi and Nath (2010) presented a differentially
private method of answering queries on time-series data. They used Discrete Fourier Trans-
form to reduce the data dimension and homomorphic encryption to perform distributed
noise addition which outperformed the naive noise addition method. Xiao et al. (2011)
presented a differentially private range-counting method where they used wavelets to trans-
form the data before adding noise. Effectiveness of the method was analyzed and also
demonstrated empirically. The noisy minimax filter presented in this paper, especially the
preprocessing approach, is similar in concept to those works in that the combination of data
transformation and perturbation is used to enhance utility. However, the transform in this
paper (i.e., the minimax filter) is learned from data for specific tasks unlike the Fourier or
the Wavelet transform which are data and task independent.
Lastly, the alternating optimization algorithm (Alg. 1) presented in this paper is related
to the algorithm proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2014). The algorithm proposed in this paper
solves a min-diff-max problem to find an optimal utility-privacy tradeoff, while Goodfellow
et al. (2014) solve a minimax problem to learn generative models.
Parts of this paper have appeared in conference proceedings (Hamm, 2015, 2017). New
materials in this paper include reformulations of concepts and terms, ERM-like analysis of
generalization error, new closed-form examples for minimax optimization, and an alternat-
ing optimization algorithm to solve minimax problems.
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3. Minimax Filter
In this section, minimax filter is introduced and discussed in detail, and its generalization
error is analyzed.
3.1 Formulation
Minimax filter is a non-invertible transformation of raw features/attributes such that the
transformed data have optimal utility-privacy tradeoff. Non-invertibility is assumed so
that original features are not always recoverable from the filtered data. Let’s assume the
filter is deterministic; randomize filters will be discussed in Sec. 5. Let X ⊂ RD be the
space of features/attributes as real-valued vectors. Note that discrete attributes can also
be represented by real vectors, e.g., by one-hot vector. Let the filter be a map
g(x;u) ∈ G : X × U → Rd (1)
which is continuous in x and is continuously differentiable w.r.t. the parameter u ∈ U . Given
a filtered output g(x), an adversary can make a prediction hp(g(x); v) of a private variable
y which can be an identifying or sensitive attribute. The prediction function hp(g(x); v)
parameterized by v ∈ V is also assumed to be continuous in v and continuously differentiable
w.r.t. to the input g(x). The paper proposes to use expected risk to measure the privacy
of filtered output against adversarial inference:
fpriv(u, v) , E[lp(hp(g(x;u); v), y)], (2)
where lp(·) is a continuously differentiable loss function. From the assumptions above, fpriv
is continuously differentiable w.r.t. the filter parameter u.
Trivial solutions to maximize privacy already exist, which are the filters that output
random or constant numbers independent of actual data. However, such filters have no
utility whatsoever for any party. To avoid such trivial solutions, it is necessary to consider
the secondary goal of maximizing utility.
Suppose the disutility of filtered data is measured by the distortion of the original data. If
g(x;u) is the filter/encoder X → Rd, then one can construct the decoder h(· ;w) : Rd → X ,
such that following reconstruction error
futil(u,w) , E[‖hu(g(x;u);w)− x‖2], (3)
is minimized (i.e., minw futil(u,w).)
For another example of utility, let z be a target variable that is of interest to the
subjects and analysts such as medical diagnosis of users’ data. An analyst can make a
prediction hu(g(x);w) parameterized by w ∈ W, which is assumed to be continuous in w
and continuously differentiable w.r.t. the input g(x). The (dis)utility of the filtered output
for a non-adversarial analyst can also be measured by the expected risk
futil(u,w) , E[lu(hu(g(x;u);w), z)], (4)
where lu(·) is a continuously differentiable loss function, such that futil is continuously
differentiable w.r.t. the filter parameter u. To facilitate the analysis, the paper assumes
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that the constraint sets W, V, and U are compact and convex subsets of Euclidean spaces
such as a ball with a large but finite radius. Along with the assumption that the filter g and
the risks fpriv and futil are all continuous, min and max values are bounded and attainable.
In addition, the solutions to min or max problems are assumed to be in the interior of W,
V, and U , enforced by adding appropriate regularization (e.g, λ‖w‖2) to the optimization
problems if necessary. For this reason, min or max problems that appear in the paper will
be treated as unconstrained and the notations u ∈ U , v ∈ V, and w ∈ W will be omitted.
Having defined the privacy measure and the utility measure, the goal of a filter designer
is to find a filter that achieves the following two objectives. The first objective is to maximize
privacy
max
u
min
v
fpriv(u, v) (or equivalently, min
u
max
v
−fpriv(u, v)) (5)
where minv fpriv(u, v) represents the risk of the worst (i.e., most capable) adversary: the
smaller the risk, the more accurately can she infer the sensitive variable y. As mentioned
before, this problem alone has a trivial solution such as a constant filter that outputs zeros.
The second objective is to minimize disutility
min
u
min
w
futil(u,w) (or equivalently, min
u
−max
w
−futil(u,w)) (6)
where minw futil(u,w) represents the risk of the best analyst: the smaller the risk, the more
accurately can the analyst reconstruct original data x or predict the variable of interest
z. To achieve the two opposing goals, we can solve the joint problem of minimizing the
weighted sum
min
u
[
max
v
−fpriv(u, v) + ρ min
w
futil(u,w)
]
, (7)
or equivalently the weighted difference of max values
min
u
[
max
v
−fpriv(u, v)− ρmax
w
−futil(u,w)
]
. (8)
The constant ρ > 0 determines the relative importance of utility versus privacy. For a small
ρ 1, the problem is close to a trivial privacy-only task, and for a large ρ 1, the problem
is close to a utility-only task. The solution to (7) or (8) will be referred to as minimax
filter3 and is by definition an optimal filter for utility-privacy tradeoff in terms of expected
risks given the family of filters {g(· ;u)|u ∈ U}, the family of private losses/classifiers
{lp(hp(· ; v))|v ∈ V} and the family of utility losses/classifiers {lu(hu(· ;w))|w ∈ W}. Note
that the choice of filter and loss/classifier families is very flexible, with the assumption
of differentiability only. In practice, almost-everywhere differentiability suffices to use the
algorithm in the paper. Fig. 1 shows an example filter/classifier from the class of multilayer
neural networks. As an aside, the joint problem may be formulated as minimization of
disutility with a hard constraint on privacy risk. When using interior-point methods, the
procedure is similar to solving (8) iteratively with an increasing ρ, which is more demanding
than minimizing the weighted sum only once as the paper proposes.
3. To be precise, the joint task (7) is a min-diff-max problem and the privacy-only task (5) is a minimax
problem. However, both will be referred to as minimax as (7) can be rewritten as a standard minimax
problem.
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Figure 1: Minimax filter with a filter/classifiers from the class of multilayer neural networks.
3.2 Notes on private and utility tasks
The private variable y can be any attribute which is considered sensitive or identifying.
For example, let y be any number or string unique to a person in the data set. Such
identifiers are bijective with {1, ..., S}, where S is the total number of subjects, so assume
y ∈ {1, ..., S}. The private task for an adversary is then to predict the subject number y from
the filtered data g(x), whose inaccuracy is measured by the expected risk of the identification
task. That is, the less accurate the private classifier is, the more anonymous the filtered
output is. The identity variable can also be group identifiers, e.g., y is a demographic
grouping based on age, sex, ethnicity, etc. Another example of private tasks is to single-out
a particular subject among the rest, in which case y is binary: y = −1 means ‘not the
target subject’ and y = 1 means ‘target subject’. To summarize, anonymity of filtered
data in this paper means resilience to inference attacks on any variable y that we choose.
This unifying approach is convenient since we need not determine whether an attribute is
an identifier, a quasi-identifier or a sensitive attribute as in syntactic anonymization. Any
information hidden in the continuous high-dimensional features which are relevant to the
private variable y—whatever it may be—will be maximally filtered out by construction.
Similarly, the target variable z of interest can be any variable that is not the same as the
private variable y. In the pathological case where they are the same (z = y), the objective
(8) becomes
min
u
[
(1− ρ) max
v
−f(u, v)
]
(9)
which is either a trivial privacy-only problem when 0 ≤ ρ < 1, or a utility-only problem
when ρ > 1. In general, z and y will be correlated to a certain degree, and the minimax
filter will find the best compromise of utility and privacy risks.
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Also, private and target tasks need not be classification tasks only. Regression tasks
can also be used as a target task, as well as unsupervised tasks that do not require label z.
Unsupervised tasks are useful when the target task is unknown or non-specific. For example,
(3) measures the expected least-squares error between the original and the reconstructed
features.
3.3 Multiple tasks
Extension of the idea in the previous section to multiple private and target tasks is straight-
forward. Suppose there are Np private tasks f
1
priv(u, v1), ..., f
Np
priv(u, vNp) associated with
private random variables y1, ..., yNp. Note that f ipriv(u, vi) = E[l
i
p(h
i(g(x;u); vi), y
i)]. Simi-
larly, suppose there are Nu target tasks f
1
util(u,w1), ..., f
Nu
util(u,wNu) associated with target
random variables z1, ..., zNu. If κ1, ..., κNp are the coefficients representing relative impor-
tance of private tasks, and ρ1, ..., ρNu are the coefficients for utility tasks, then the final
objective is to solve the following problem
min
u
 Np∑
i=1
κi max
vi
−f ipriv(u, vi) +
Nu∑
i=1
ρi min
wi
f iutil(u,wi)
 . (10)
Since this can be rewritten as
min
u
 max
v1,...,vNp
−
Np∑
i=1
κif
i
priv(u, vi) + minw1,...,wNu
Nu∑
i=1
ρif
i
util(u,wi)
 , (11)
this multiple task problem is nearly identical to the original single task problem (7), with
the new utility and privacy tasks defined as
fˆpriv(u, v=(v1, ..., vNp)) ,
∑
i
κif
i
priv(u, vi), and (12)
fˆutil(u,w=(w1, ..., wNu)) ,
∑
i
ρif
i
util(u,wi), (13)
with ρ = 1. Using this, it is straightforward to extend the analysis and algorithms developed
for single tasks to those for multiple tasks.
3.4 Generalization performance of minimax filter
The proposed privacy mechanism is a learning-based approach. An optimal filter is one
that solves the expected risk optimization (7). However, in reality, an optimal filter has
to be estimated from finite training samples, and we need a guarantee on the performance
of the learned filter on unseen test samples. This section derives generalization bounds for
empirical minimax filter similar to the derivation of bounds for empirical risk minimizers
(ERM).
The joint problem for expected risks was
min
u
[
max
v
−fpriv(u, v) + ρmin
w
futil(u,w)
]
= min
u
[
max
v
−E[lp(u, v)] + ρmin
w
E[lu(u,w)]
]
.
(14)
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A joint loss lJ is introduced for convenience:
lJ(u, v, w) , −lp(u, v) + ρ lu(u,w). (15)
Let (u∗, v∗, w∗) be a solution to the expected risk optimization problem:
ED[lJ(u
∗, v∗, w∗)] = min
u
[
max
v
ED[−lp(u, v)] + ρmin
w
ED[lu(u,w)]
]
, (16)
where ED[·] is the expected value w.r.t. the unknown data distribution P (x, y). Similarly,
let (uˆ, vˆ, wˆ) be a solution to the empirical risk minimax problem:
ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)] = min
u
[
max
v
ES [−lp(u, v)] + ρmin
w
ES [lu(u,w)]
]
, (17)
where the empirical mean ES [·] for S = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xN , yN )} is
ES [l(x, y)] ,
1
N
∑
(x,y)∈S
l(x, y). (18)
The goal in this analysis is to show that the expected and the empirical optimizers perform
equally well in expectation/probability given enough training samples:
ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)] ' ED[lJ(u∗, v∗, w∗)], as N →∞. (19)
The main result is the Theorem 4 which is proved in the remainder of this section. Let’s
define optimal parameters v(u) and w(u) given u as
v∗(u) , arg max
v
ED[−lp(u, v)], vˆ(u) , arg max
v
ES [−lp(u, v)], (20)
w∗(u) , arg min
w
ED[lu(u,w)], wˆ(u) , arg min
w
ES [lu(u,w)]. (21)
One can then write
ED[lJ(u
∗, v∗, w∗)] = min
u
[ED[−lp(u, v∗(u))] + ρED[lu(u,w∗(u))]] (22)
= min
u
ED[lJ(u, v
∗(u), w∗(u))], (23)
and similarly
ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)] = min
u
[ES [−lp(u, vˆ(u))] + ρES [lu(u, wˆ(u))]] = min
u
ES [lJ(u, vˆ(u), wˆ(u))].
(24)
From these definitions we have for all u,
ED[lJ(u
∗, v∗, w∗)] ≤ ED[lJ(u, v∗(u), w∗(u))], (25)
ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)] ≤ ES [lJ(u, vˆ(u), wˆ(u))]. (26)
Also from definition, for all (u, v, w),
ED[lJ(u, v, w
∗(u))] ≤ ED[lJ(u, v, w)] ≤ ED[lJ(u, v∗(u), w)], (27)
ES [lJ(u, v, wˆ(u))] ≤ ES [lJ(u, v, w)] ≤ ES [lJ(u, vˆ(u), w)]. (28)
These observations imply the following theorem.
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Theorem 1 The risk difference of expected and empirical optimizers is at most twice the
largest difference of expected and empirical risks of any set of parameters:
|ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ED[lJ(u∗, v∗, w∗)]| ≤ 2 sup
u,v,w
|ED[lJ(u, v, w)]− ES [lJ(u, v, w)]| . (29)
Proof The expected risk of empirical risk optimizers (uˆ, vˆ, wˆ) is upper-bounded by the risk
of expected risk optimizers (u∗, v∗, w∗) as follows:
ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ED[lJ(u∗, v∗, w∗)]
= ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− (ED[lJ(u∗, v∗, w∗)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)])
≤ ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− (ED[lJ(u∗, v∗, w∗)]− ES [lJ(u∗, vˆ(u∗), wˆ(u∗))]) (from (26))
≤ ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− (ED[lJ(u∗, vˆ(u∗), w∗)]− ES [lJ(u∗, vˆ(u∗), wˆ(u∗))]) (from (27))
≤ ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− (ED[lJ(u∗, vˆ(u∗), w∗)]− ES [lJ(u∗, vˆ(u∗), w∗)]) (from (28))
≤ 2 sup
u,v,w
|ED[lJ(u, v, w)]− ES [lJ(u, v, w)]| .
The difference can also be lower-bounded as follows:
ED[lJ(u
∗, v∗, w∗)]− ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]
= ED[lJ(u
∗, v∗, w∗)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− (ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)])
≤ ED[lJ(uˆ, v∗(uˆ), w∗(uˆ))]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− (ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]) (from (25))
≤ ED[lJ(uˆ, v∗(uˆ), w∗(uˆ))]− ES [lJ(uˆ, v∗(uˆ), wˆ)]− (ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]) (from (28))
≤ ED[lJ(uˆ, v∗(uˆ), wˆ)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, v∗(uˆ), wˆ)]− (ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]− ES [lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]) (from (27))
≤ 2 sup
u,v,w
|ED[lJ(u, v, w)]− ES [lJ(u, v, w)]| .
To bound the RHS of (29), one can use the Rademacher complexity theory (e.g., Lemma
26.2 of Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David (2014).)
Lemma 2 Let F be a class of real-valued functions, and let S be a set of N samples
S = {(x1, y1), ..., (xN , yN )}. Then,
ES∼DN
[
sup
f∈F
|ED[f ]− ES [f ]|
]
≤ 2ES∼DN [R(F ◦ S)], (30)
where R(F ◦ S) is the empirical Rademacher complexity
R(f ◦ S) , 1
N
Eσ∼{−1,+1}N
[
sup
f∈F
N∑
i=1
σif(xi, yi)
]
(31)
for the class of real-valued functions {(x, y) 7→ f(x, y) : ∀f ∈ F}.
Consider the class of real-valued functions defined from the joint loss (15):
lJ ◦HJ ◦ S , {(x, y, z) 7→ lJ(x, y, z;u, v, w) : u ∈ U , v ∈ V, w ∈ W} (32)
= {(x, y, z) 7→ −lp(hv(gu(x)), y) + ρ lu(hw(gu(x)), z) : u ∈ U , v ∈ V, w ∈ W}.
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Let R(lJ ◦ HJ ◦ S) denote the empirical Rademacher complexity of the joint loss class.
Furthermore, the Rademacher complexity of sum of functions can be upper-bounded by the
sum of complexities:
Lemma 3 The empirical Rademacher complexity of the joint privacy-utility loss is upper-
bounded as
R(lJ ◦HJ ◦ S) ≤ R(lp ◦Hp ◦G ◦ S) + ρ R(lu ◦Hu ◦G ◦ S), (ρ > 0) (33)
where
lp ◦Hp ◦G ◦ S , {(x, y, z) 7→ lp(hp(gu(x)), y) : u ∈ U , v ∈ V}, (34)
lu ◦Hu ◦G ◦ S , {(x, y, z) 7→ lu(hu(gu(x)), z) : u ∈ U , w ∈ W}. (35)
Proof
R(lJ ◦HJ ◦ S) = 1
N
Eσ
[
sup
u,v,w
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
σilJ(xi, yi, zi;u, v, w)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
(36)
=
1
N
Eσ
[
sup
u,v,w
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
σi(−lp(xi, yi;u, v) + ρ lu(xi, zi;u,w))
∣∣∣∣∣
]
(37)
≤ 1
N
Eσ
[
sup
u,v
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
σilp(xi, yi;u, v)
∣∣∣∣∣+ ρ supu,w
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
σilu(xi, zi;u,w)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
(38)
= R(lp ◦Hp ◦G ◦ S) + ρ R(lu ◦Hu ◦G ◦ S). (39)
From Theorem 1 and Lemmas 2 and 3, we get the following generalization bounds in terms
of the Rademacher complexity.
Theorem 4
ES∼Dm [|ED[lJ(u∗, v∗, w∗)]− ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]|]
≤ 4ES∼Dm [R(lp ◦Hp ◦G ◦ S) + ρ R(lu ◦Hu ◦G ◦ S)] . (40)
A probabilistic bound instead of expected value can also be obtained by applying McDi-
armid’s inequality, which is omitted.
The Rademacher complexity of privacy and utility losses depends on our choice of loss
functions, hypothesis classes, and filter classes. For the simple case of linear filters and
linear classifiers, one can compute the complexity using the following lemmas (26.9 and
26.10 from Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David (2014)):
Lemma 5 Suppose φ : R → R is α-Lipschitz, i.e., |φ(a) − φ(b)| ≤ α|a − b|, ∀a, b ∈ R.
Then,
R(φ ◦ F ) = αR(F ). (41)
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Lemma 6 For the class of linear classifiers H = {x 7→ wTx : ‖w‖2 ≤ 1},
R(H ◦ S) ≤ 1√
N
sup
x∈S
‖x‖2. (42)
.
From these lemmas and Theorem 4, we have a corollary for a simple case of linear filters
and classifiers.
Corollary 7 Let the loss functions lu and lp be α-Lipschitz (e.g., α = 1 for logistic regres-
sion.) Suppose U is a d × D real matrix with a bounded norm ‖U‖2 ≤ 1, and w and v
are vectors with bounded norms (‖w‖2 ≤ 1 and ‖v‖2 ≤ 1). If the feature domain X is also
bounded with a radius r = maxx∈X ‖x‖2, then we have
|ED[lJ(u∗, v∗, w∗)]− ED[lJ(uˆ, vˆ, wˆ)]| ≤ 4(1 + ρ) α r√
N
. (43)
Alternatively, one can use the VC dimension to specify the bound.
In any case, the generalization bounds in this section justify the claim that minimax
filter can preserve utility-privacy of unseen test data in expectation or probability.
4. Minimax Optimization
This section presents theoretical and numerical solutions of the joint problem (8), which is
a variant of unconstrained continuous minimax problems. (See Rustem and Howe (2009)
for a review.) The problem (8) can be written in an equivalent form
min
u
Φ(u) = min
u
[Φpriv(u)− ρ Φutil(u)] (44)
= min
u
[max
v
−fpriv(u, v)− ρ max
w
−futil(u,w)] (45)
The optimization above is a min-diff-max problem and can be considered as simultane-
ously solving two subproblems minu[maxv −fpriv(u, v)] and minu[−maxw−futil(u,w)], but
is evidently not the same as summing individual solutions
min
u
Φ(u) 6= min
u
[max
v
−fpriv(u, v)] + min
u
[−ρmax
w
−futil(u,w)]. (46)
Since the second subproblem minu[−maxw−futil(u,w)] = minu,w futil(u,w) is a standard
minimization problem, let’s focus only on the first subproblem minu[maxv −fpriv(u, v)]
which is a continuous minimax problem. Continuous minimax problems are in general
more challenging to solve than standard minimization problems, as the inner optimization
Φpriv(u) = maxv −fpriv does not usually have a closed-form solution; when it does, the
whole problem can be treated as a standard minimization problem. Furthermore, there
can be more than one solution to Φpriv(u) = maxv −fpriv. To better understand minimax
problems, we look at several examples starting from a simple case where Φpriv and Φutil
have closed-form solutions.
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4.1 Simple case: eigenvalue problem
Consider finding a minimax filter for the following problem. The filter class is a linear
dimensionality reduction (g(x;u) = UTx) parameterized by the matrix U ∈ RD×d, and the
private and target tasks are least-squares regressions parameterized by the matrices V and
W :
fpriv(U, V ) =
1
N
∑
i
‖V TUTxi − yi‖2, and (47)
futil(U,W ) =
1
N
∑
i
‖W TUTxi − zi‖2. (48)
In this case, Φpriv(U) = maxV −fp(U, V ) and Φutil(U) = maxW −fu(U,W ) are both concave
problems with closed-form solutions
Vˆ = arg min
V
fpriv = (U
TCxxU)
−1UTCxy and (49)
Wˆ = arg min
W
futil = (U
TCxxU)
−1UTCxz, (50)
where
Cxy =
1
N
∑
i
xiy
T
i , Cxz =
1
N
∑
i
xiz
T
i , and Cxx =
1
N
∑
i
xix
T
i . (51)
The corresponding min values are
Φpriv(U) = −fpriv(U, Vˆ ) = Tr
[
(UTCxxU)
−1UTCxyCTxyU
]
+ const, and (52)
Φutil(U) = −futil(U, Wˆ ) = Tr
[
(UTCxxU)
−1UTCxzCTxzU
]
+ const. (53)
The outer minimization over u is then
min
U
Φ(U) = min
U
[Φpriv(U)− ρΦutil(U)] (54)
= min
U
[
−fpriv(U, Vˆ ) + ρfutil(U, Wˆ )
]
= min
U
Tr
[
(UTCxxU)
−1 UTCxyzU
]
,(55)
where
Cxyz = CxyC
T
xy − ρCxzCTxz. (56)
The problem (55) can be reformulated as a generalized eigenvalue problem. Let Q = C
1/2
xx U
be a D × d full-rank matrix. The problem can be rewritten as
min
U
Tr
[
(UTCxxU)
−1 UTCxyzU
]
= min
Q
Tr
[
(QTQ)−1QTC−1/2xx CxyzC
−1/2
xx Q
]
. (57)
Furthermore, note that min value (55) is invariant to the right multiplication of U by any
d× d nonsingular matrix R. So chose R so that QTQ = RTUTCxxUR = Id without loss of
generality. Let A = (C
−1/2
xx )TCxyzC
−1/2
xx , and the minimax problem becomes the following
eigenvalue problem:
min
U
Φ(U) = min
{Q | QTQ=Id}
Tr QTAQ, (58)
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which is the sum of the d smallest eigenvalues of A which may not be positive semidefinite.
Note that this special case problem is quite similar to the objective of Enev et al. (2012):
max
u
[−λuTCTxyCxyu+ uTCTxzCxzu], s. t. uTu = 1.
The paper also proposes a variant of the eigenvalue problem (58), called Privacy LDS
which is an analogue of linear discriminant analysis (LDS) for privacy-utility optimization
problem. Define the symmetric positive semidefinite matrix Cu as
Cu =
K∑
k=1
Nk(µk − µ)(µk − µ)T , (59)
where
z ∈ {1, ...,K}, Nk =
N∑
i=1
I[zi = k], µk =
1
Nk
N∑
i=1
xiI[zi = k], and µ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi, (60)
Define Cp similarly with
y ∈ {1, ...,K ′}, N ′k =
N ′∑
i=1
I[yi = k], and µ
′
k =
1
N ′k
N ′∑
i=1
xiI[yi = k]. (61)
The proposed Privacy LDS is a linear filter g(x;U) = UTx, where U = [u1, ..., ud] is a
matrix of top eigenvectors ui’s from the following generalized eigenvalue problem:
max
‖u‖=1
uT (Cu + λI)u
uT (Cp + λI)u
. (62)
This paper uses Privacy LDS as a heuristic to find the initial linear filter before fine-tuning
the parameter u using a general optimization method presented in the following sections.
Note that this initialization is applicable only to linear filters.
4.2 Saddle-point problem
Continuous minimax problems cannot in general be solved in closed form and require nu-
merical solvers. There is a subclass of continuous minimax problems which are easier to
solve than others. Saddle-point problems are minimax problems for which f(u, v) is convex
in u and concave in v, such as the following “saddle” problem
min
u
max
v
f(u, v) = min
u
max
v
[u2 − v2]. (63)
Analogous to convex problems, f(u, v) has a global optimum (u∗, v∗) which satisfies
f(u∗, v) ≤ f(u∗, v∗) ≤ f(u, v∗). (64)
The convergence rate of a simple subgradient-descent method for saddle-point problems was
previously analyzed by Nedic´ and Ozdaglar (2009). Unfortunately, the minimax problem
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minu maxv −fpriv considered in this paper is not a saddle-point problem even for a relatively
simple case. Suppose one chooses linear filters, convex differentiable losses (e.g., least-
squares, logistic, or exponential losses) and linear classifiers for the problem. Then
−fpriv(u, v) = −E[l(g(u); v)] = −E[l(yvTUTx)] (65)
is the negative expected value of the composition of a convex l(·) and a linear UTx, which
is concave in U and is also concave in v, which cannot be a saddle-point problem.
4.3 General problem
A general numerical solution to the optimization (44) is described in this section. Let
f(u, v) be a real-valued function f : U ×V → R, where U and V are compact subsets of the
Euclidean space. Suppose f is jointly continuous and has a continuous partial derivative
∇uf w.r.t. the first variable u. The maximum over v
Φ(u) = max
v∈V
f(u, v) (66)
has a property that Φ(u) is in general not differentiable in u even if f(u, v) is (Danskin,
1967). Suppose V (u) is the set of maximizers of f given u:
V (u) = {vˆ ∈ V | f(u, vˆ) = max
v∈V
f(u, v)}. (67)
Danskin proved that the directional derivative DyΦ(u) in any direction y ∈ Rd can be
written as the maximum directional derivatives of f(u, v) over all vˆ ∈ V (u):
DyΦ(u) = max
vˆ∈V (u)
Dyf(u, vˆ), (68)
where Dyf(u, v) is the directional derivative of f w.r.t. u. Furthermore, in the case where
V (u) is a singleton {vˆ(u)} for each u, we have
DyΦ(u) = Dyf(u, vˆ(u)). (69)
There are several classic minimax optimization algorithms using this property. Suppose
f(u, v) is also continuously differentiable w.r.t. v, and ∇uf is continuously differentiable
w.r.t. v. A first-order method for minimax problems was proposed by Panin (1981) and
was later refined by Kiwiel (1987). The latter uses a linear approximation of f at a fixed u¯
along the direction q
f l(q, v) = f(u¯, v) + 〈∇uf(u¯, v), q〉, (70)
and uses it to compute the approximate max value
Φl(q) = max
v
f l(q, v). (71)
Using this approximation, a line search can be performed along the descent direction q
that minimizes the max function Φ(u¯+ αq). In particular, with additional assumptions of
Lipschitz continuity of ∇uf and compactness of U and V, Kiwiel’s algorithm monotonically
decreases f for each iteration and converges to a stationary point u∗, i.e., a point u for
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which maxv〈∇uf(u∗, v), q〉 ≥ 0 for all directions q. Previously, Hamm (2015) used Kiwiel’s
algorithm to solve the optimization problems (44). However, one disadvantage of the method
was its slow speed in practice, due to the auxiliary routine of finding the descent direction
q at each iteration, described in the supplementary material of Hamm (2015).
Instead, this paper proposes a simple alternating algorithm (Alg. 1) for solving min-diff-
max problem based directly on Danskin’s theorem. The algorithm only assumes fpriv(u, v)
and futil(u,w) to be jointly continuous and have continuous partial derivatives ∇ufpriv and
∇ufutil. Additionally, if fpriv(u, v) and futil(u,w) are convex in v and w respectively, then
the global minima
vt = arg min
v
fpriv(ut, v) and wt = arg min
w
futil(ut, w) (72)
can be found easily, either approximately or accurately. Furthermore, if futil and fpriv are
strongly convex (e.g., due to regularization), the solutions are unique. Consequently, the
descent direction qt in Alg. 1 is truly the (negative) gradient of Φ(u) (44) as desired:
qt = ∇ufpriv(u, vt)− ρ∇ufutil(u,wt) = −∇uΦpriv(u) + ρ ∇uΦutil(u) = −∇uΦ(u). (73)
Note that it is still a heuristic for non-convex futil and fpriv such as when using neural
networks for the filter and/or the classifiers. A related heuristic for minimax problems was
proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2014) for learning generative models.
Algorithm 1 Alternating algorithm for min-diff-max
Input: data {(xi, yi, zi)}, filter g, loss l, classifier h, tradeoff coefficient ρ, max iteration T ,
learning rates (αt)
Output: optimal filter parameter u
Begin:
Initialize u1
for t = 1, ..., T do
Solve (approximately)
vt = arg min
v
fpriv(ut, v) and wt = arg min
w
futil(ut, w), where (74)
fpriv(u, v) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
lp(hp(g(xi;u); v), yi) and futil(u,w) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
lu(hu(g(xi;u);w), zi).
(75)
Compute the descent direction by
qt = ∇ufpriv(u, vt)− ρ∇ufutil(u,wt) (76)
Perform line search along qt and update ut+1 = ut + αt · qt
Exit if solution converged
end for
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The proposed optimization algorithm and supporting classes are implemented in Python
and are available on the open-source repository4.
5. Noisy Minimax Filter
The privacy guarantee that minimax filter provides is very different from that of differentially-
private mechanisms. As the filter is learned from training data, its privacy guarantee for
test data is given only in expectation/probability. Besides, it is a deterministic mechanism
which cannot provide differential privacy. This section presents the noisy minimax filter that
combines minimax filter with additive noise mechanism to satisfy the differential privacy
criterion. Two methods of combination—preprocessing and postprocessing—are proposed
and compared. For completeness, the definition of differential privacy is given briefly.
5.1 Differential privacy
A randomized algorithm that takes dataD as input and outputs f˜(D) is called -differentially
private if
Pr(f˜(D) ∈ S) ≤ ePr(f˜(D′) ∈ S) (77)
for all measurable S ⊂ T of the output range and for all data sets D and D′ differing in a
single item, denoted by D ∼ D′. That is, even if an adversary knows the whole data set
D except for a single item, she cannot infer much more about the unknown item from the
output of the algorithm. A well-known mechanism for turning a non-private function f into
a private function f˜ is the perturbation by additive noise. When an algorithm outputs a
real-valued vector f(D) ∈ RD, its global sensitivity (Dwork et al., 2006) is defined as
S(f) = max
D∼D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖ (78)
where ‖ · ‖ is a norm such as the Euclidean norm. An important result from Dwork et al.
(2006) is that the perturbation by additive noise
f˜(D) = f(D) + ξ, (79)
where ξ has the Laplace-like probability density whose scale parameter is proportional to
S(f)
P (ξ) ∝ e− S(f)‖ξ‖, (80)
is -differentially private.
This paper considers local differential privacy (Duchi et al., 2013) of the filter output
g(x), that is, perturbation is applied by each subject before g(x) is released to a third party.
Let X = {x1, ..., xS} be a collection of data from S subjects. Then, X = {x1, ..., xS} and
X ′ = {x′1, ..., x′S} are defined as neighbors if xi = x′i for all i = 1, ..., S except for some
j ∈ 1, ..., S. For this subject, xj and x′j can be any two samples from the common feature
space X of all subjects. Consequently, a randomized filter g˜(·) is -differentially private if
for all x, x′ ∈ X and all measurable S ⊂ T of the output range,
Pr(g˜(x) ∈ S) ≤ ePr(g˜(x′) ∈ S). (81)
4. https://github.com/jihunhamm/MinimaxFilter
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Figure 2: Preprocessing and postprocessing approaches to differentially private minimax
filtering.
To use additive noise mechanism (79), the sensitivity (78) of the output g(·) needs to be
determined:
S(g) = sup
x,x′∈X
‖g(x)− g(x′)‖, (82)
which is finite if X is compact and g(·) is continuous. If X is unbounded, one can directly
bound the diameter of g(X ) by bounding functions. Examples of the bounding function
b : RD → RD are
1. Hard-bounding by clipping: b(h) = min{1/a, 1/‖h‖} · h for some a > 0,
2. Soft-bounding by squashing: b(h) = tanh(a‖h‖) for some a > 0, and
3. Normalization after clipping: b(h) = h/‖h‖,
where h = g(x) is the filter output of a sample x ∈ X . Note that these functions enforce
the sensitivity S(b(g)) to be at most 2, regardless of X or g(·). The threshold a can be
determined from the training data.
5.2 Preprocessing vs postprocessing
Minimax filters can be made locally differentially private using the additive noise mechanism
(79) in the signal chain of filtering. The paper proposes two approaches. In the preprocessing
approach, filtering is performed first and is followed by perturbation. In the postprocessing
approach, perturbation is applied first and is followed by filtering. Note that preprocessing
and postprocessing approaches are similar to output perturbation and input perturbation
in Sarwate and Chaudhuri (2013). Fig. 2 shows the signal chains of the two approaches.
In preprocessing, the original feature x is first filtered by g(x), and then made differential
private by a bounding function and perturbation b(g(x))+ξ. In postprocessing, the original
feature x is first made differentially private by a bounding function and perturbation b(x)+ξ
followed by filtering g(b(x)+ξ). By adding an appropriate amount of noise, both approaches
can be made -differentially private regardless of data distribution. However, when the
noisy mechanism is used in conjunction with a minimax filter which is dependent on data
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distribution P (x, y, z), preprocessing and postprocessing approaches have different effects
that depend on the distribution.
A scenario when preprocessing is preferable to postprocessing is as follows. For the
convenience of explanation, let’s assume that subject identification is the private task. Let
y(x) be the subject identity label of sample x and let z(x) be the target label of sample
x for any target task. Define between-subject diameter as the max distance of two samples
x, x′ from different subjects that have the same target label:
Sb , max
x,x′∈X
‖x− x′‖ s.t. y(x) 6= y(x′), z(x) = z(x′). (83)
Similarly, define within-subject diameter as the max distance of two samples x, x′ from the
same subject that have different target labels:
Sw , max
x,x′∈X
‖x− x′‖ s.t. y(x) = y(x′), z(x) 6= z(x′). (84)
Also for the purpose of explanation, assume that the filter g is an orthogonal projection
onto a lower-dimensional Euclidean space. For a given data set X , if the between-subject
diameter is larger than the within-subject diameter (Sb > Sw) in the original feature space
(Fig. 3a), then minimax filtering can potentially reduce the diameter S(g) = maxx,x′ ‖g(x)−
g(x′)‖ significantly. This translates to less amount of noise required to achieve the same -
privacy than the amount of noise required before filtering, as the data diameter has shrunk.
This will result in better utility of the preprocessing approach over the postprocessing
approach where noise is added before filtering. From the same reasoning, if the opposite is
true (Sw > Sb) (Fig. 3b), then the diameter S(g) after minimax filtering does not change
much, and the preprocessing approach may not offer much benefit over the postprocessing
approach. However, there are still other differences between the two approaches. This paper
assumes that the training data are public information and their privacy is not the primary
concern unlike the privacy of test data. However, if we begin to consider the privacy of
training data as well, then one should be aware that the learned filters can leak private
information, analogous to how the PCA components can leak information about training
data (Chaudhuri et al., 2012), and that the filters also need to be sanitized before release.
The postprocessing approach makes the whole process simpler. In this case, after each
data owner perturbs the data by herself, any subsequent postprocessing, whether it is the
process of applying pretrained filters or the process of training minimax filters, does not
worsen differential privacy guarantees (Dwork et al., 2014), and therefore the postprocessing
approach is a safer choice when the data owners cannot trust the entity that collects training
data.
6. Experiments
In this section, the algorithms proposed in the paper are evaluated using three real-world
data sets: face data for gender/expression classification, speech data for emotion classifi-
cation, and motion data for activity classification. Firstly, minimax filters are compared
with non-minimax methods in terms of privacy breach vs utility as measured by accuracy of
private and target tasks classifiers on test data. Secondly, noisy minimax filters are tested
under various conditions using the same data sets.
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Figure 3: Two example data distributions which have the same data diameter before filter-
ing but have different diameters after filtering. a. an example where between-
subject diameter (83) is large. b. an example where within-subject diameter (84)
is large.
6.1 Methods
Filters. The following minimax and non-minimax filters are compared.
• Rand: random subspace projection with g(x;U) = UTx, where U is a random full
rank D × d matrix.
• PCA: principal component analysis with g(x;U) = UTx, where U is the eigenvectors
corresponding to d largest eigenvalues of Cov(x).
• PPLS: private partial least squares, using Algorithm 1 from Enev et al. (2012).
• DDD: discriminately decreasing discriminability (DDD) from Whitehill and Movellan
(2012) with a mask-type filter from the code5.
• Minimax 1: linear filter g(x;U) = UTx where U is computed from Alg. (1).
• Minimax 2: nonlinear filter g(x) from a two-layer sigmoid neural network with of
hidden nodes of 20 and 10, computed from Alg. 1.
Remarks. DDD requires analytical solutions to eigenvalue problems which are unavailable
for multiclass problems, and is used only in the binary problem with the face database.
Also, DDD uses a mask-type filter in the codes, and the dimension d is same as the image
size. The dimension d is also irrelevant to nonlinear Minimax filter 2 since it does not use
linear dimensionality reduction. The nonlinear filter is pretrained as a stacked denoising
autoencoders (Vincent et al., 2008) followed by supervised backpropagation with the target
task. Classifier/loss. For all experiments, binary or multinomial logistic regression is used
a classifier for both utility and privacy risks, where the loss l(h(g(x;u); v), y) is the negative
log-likelihood with regularization:
l = −v(y)T g(x;u) + log(
K∑
k=1
ev(k)
T g(x;u)) +
λ
2
K∑
k=1
‖v(k)‖2 (85)
5. http://mplab.ucsd.edu/~jake
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where K is the number of classes. The regularization coefficient was λ = 10−6 and the
utility-privacy tradeoff coefficient was ρ = 10. The main iteration in Alg. 1 was stopped
when the progress was slow, which was between T = 20− 200.
6.2 Data sets
Gender/expression classification from face: The GENKI database (Whitehill and
Movellan, 2012) consists of face images with varying poses and facial expressions. The
original data set is used unchanged, which has N = 1740 training images (50% male and
50% female; 50% smile and 50% non-smile). The test set has 100 images (50 males and 50
females; 50 smiling and 50 non-smiling) not overlapping with the training set. The dimen-
sionality of the original data is D = 256, and the filters are tested with d = 10, 20, 50, 100.
The data set has gender and expression labels but no subject label. Consequently, gender
classification is used as the private task and expression classification is used as the target
task.
Emotion classification from speech: The ENTERFACE database (Martin et al., 2006)
is an audiovisual emotion database of 43 speakers from 14 nations reading predefined English
sentences in six induced emotions. From the raw speech signals sampled in 48 KHz, MFCC
coefficients are computed using 20 ms windows with 50% overlap and 13 Mel-frequency
bands. The mean, max, min, and standard deviation of the MFCC coefficients over the
duration of each sentence are computed, resulting in N = 427 samples of D = 52 dimen-
sional feature vectors from S = 43 subjects. Each subject’s samples are randomly split to
generate training (80%) and test (20%) sets. Average test accuracy over 10 such trials is re-
ported. Filters are tested with d = 10, 20, 30, 40. The target task is the binary classification
of ‘happy’ and ‘non-happy’ emotions from speech, and the privacy task is the multiclass
(S = 43) subject classification.
Activity classification from motion: The UCI Human Activity Recognition (HAR)
data set (Anguita et al., 2012) is a collection of motion sensor data on a smartphone by
30 subjects performing six activities (walking, walking upstairs, walking downstairs, sitting,
standing, laying). Various time and frequency domain variables are extracted from the
signal, resulting in N = 10299 samples of D = 561 dimensional features from 30 subjects
which are used unchanged. Out of 30 subjects, 15 subjects are chosen randomly. For each
domain, each subject’s samples are randomly split to generate training (50%) and test (50%)
sets. At each trial, the subjects and the training/test sets are randomized, and the average
test accuracy over 10 such trials is reported. Filters with dimensions d = 10, 20, 50, 100 are
used. The target task is the multiclass (C = 6) classification of activity, and the privacy
task is the multiclass (S = 15) subject classification.
6.3 Result 1: Minimax filters
Before any filter is applied, the accuracy of the target tasks with raw data is 0.90 (GENKI),
0.84 (ENTERFACE), and 0.97 (HAR). On the other hand, the accuracy of the private tasks
with raw data is 0.90 (GENKI), 0.62 (ENTERFACE), and 0.70 (HAR). The high accuracy
of the private tasks (considering the chance level accuracy of 0.5 (GENKI), 0.02 (ENTER-
FACE), and 0.067 (HAR)) demonstrates that an adversary can accurately infer private
variables such as gender and identity from raw data if no filter is used. A simple defense
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Figure 4: GENKI: Expression classification vs and gender classification from faces.
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Figure 5: ENTERFACE: Emotion classification vs and subject identification from speech.
against inference attack is to perform dimensionality reduction on the original data, such
as Rand and PCA projections. As the dimensionality d decreases from the original value D
towards zero, one can expect both the private and the target accuracy to decrease toward
the chance level. This trend is indeed the case with both the non-private (Rand,PCA) and
the private (PPLS,DDD,Minimax) filters used in the paper. Therefore these filters are eval-
uated at several different values of the dimensionality d to make fine-grained comparisons
of utility-privacy.
Fig. 4 shows the test accuracy with GENKI. The dotted lines are level sets of utility-
privacy tradeoff (i.e., target task accuracy - private task accuracy) shown for reference.
Minimax 2 achieves the best utility (i.e., most accurate expression classification) and Min-
imax 1 (linear) achieves the best privacy (i.e., least accurate gender classification). For all
dimensions d, Minimax 1 achieves the best utility-privacy compromise (i.e., closest to the
top-left corner of the plot), with Minimax 2 and DDD performing similarly. In terms of
private task accuracy, Minimax 1 achieves almost the chance level accuracy (0.5), which im-
plies a strong privacy preservation. DDD comes close to Minimax 1, while another private
method PPLS is not very successful in preventing the inference of the private variable. As
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Figure 6: HAR: Activity classification vs subject identification from motion.
expected, non-private methods Rand and PCA also do not reduce the privacy task accuracy.
As dimension d increases from 10 to 100, the accuracy of both the target and the private
tasks increase (toward the top-right corner of the plot) for PPLS, PCA and Rand, but the
value of utility-privacy tradeoff (i.e., target task accuracy - private task accuracy) remains
relatively similar even though d changes. Note that d is irrelevant to Minimax 2 and DDD.
Fig. 5 shows the test accuracy of ENTERFACE. Minimax 2 achieves the best utility
(i.e., most accurate emotion classification) and the best privacy (i.e., least accurate subject
classification) at the same time. PPLS performs well in this task; its private and target task
accuracy is close to those of Minimax 2. The private task accuracy of Minimax 2 is near
the chance level (1/S = 0.02) compared to 0.4 − 0.5 of non-private methods, suggesting
that seemingly harmless statistics (mean, max, min, s.d. of MFCC) are quite susceptible
to identification attacks if no privacy mechanism is used. Similar to GENKI, the accuracy
of both the target and the private tasks increases with the dimension d for PCA and Rand,
and the value of utility-privacy tradeoff remains similar regardless of d.
Fig. 6 shows the test accuracy of HAR. Minimax 1 achieves the best utility (i.e., most
accurate activity recognition) and the best privacy (i.e., least accurate subject classification),
while Minimax 2 and PPLS performs similarly well. The private task accuracy of Minimax
1 is lower than others close to the chance level (1/S = 0.067). The figure also shows that
motion data are susceptible (0.2−0.7) to identification attacks when no privacy mechanism
is used. For all dimensions d, Minimax 1 achieves the best compromise of all methods
similar to previous experiments. Also the accuracy of both the target and the private tasks
roughly increases with d for PCA and Rand, but the value of utility-privacy tradeoff remains
similar.
6.4 Result 2: Noisy minimax filters
The same data sets from the previous section are used to demonstrate the effect of noisy
mechanism on minimax filters. Four types of noisy filters are compared: PCA-pre, PCA-
post, Minimax-pre, and Minimax-post. PCA is chosen as a non-minimax reference filter
which preserves the original signal the best in the least mean-squared-error sense. PCA-
pre/post means that PCA is applied before/after the perturbation similarly to Minimax-
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Figure 7: Impact of four noisy filters (PCA-pre/post and Minimax-pre/post) on the ac-
curacy of target and private tasks for three data sets (GENKI, ENTERFACE,
HAR), over the range of −1 = {0, 10−3, 10−2, 10−1, 100, 101}. Top row is the
target task accuracy (higher the better) and bottom row is the private task ac-
curacy (lower the better.) Minimax-pre/post can limit the accuracy of inference
attack (bottom row) to almost chance levels regardless of the value of , while
PCA-pre/post requires a significantly high  to prevent inference attacks which
also destroy the utility.
pre/post from Fig. 2. For Minimax-pre/post, a linear filter of the same dimension d as
PCA-pre/post is used. Tests are performed for the same ranges of dimension d as in Sec
6.3. The results for d = 20 with all three data sets are summarized in Fig. 7. Results for
different dimensions show similar trends and are summarized in Fig. 8. Optimization of (7)
is done similarly to the previous section. All tests are repeated 10 times for different noise
samples of (80), for each of 10 random training/test splits.
Fig. 7 shows the following results. Firstly, within each plot, increasing the privacy level
from left (−1=0) to right (−1=10) lowers the accuracy of both target and private tasks for
all filter types and data sets, which is intuitively correct. Secondly, target task accuracy (top
row) shows that the four filters are equally accurate with no noise (−1=0), with Minimax-
pre/post slightly more accurate than PCA-pre/post. This observation is consistent with the
results in Sec. 6.3. In GENKI and HAR, preprocessing is better than postprocessing for both
PCA and Minimax, and Minimax-pre performs the best. In ENTERFACE, preprocessing
and postprocessing approaches perform similarly, and all four filters is perform similarly on
the target task. This result may be ascribed to the discussion of different data distribution
in Sec. 5.2. Thirdly, and most importantly, private task accuracy (bottom row) is quite
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different between Minimax-pre/post and non-minimax PCA-pre/post. For both Minimax-
pre and Minimax-post, the private task accuracy is almost as low as the chance accuracy of
each data set (0.5, 0.03, 0.07) regardless of the noise level . This demonstrates that minimax
filter can prevent inference attacks with little help of noise. In contrast, the non-minimax
filters (PCA-pre/post) allow an adversary to infer private variables quite accurately (0.8,
0.5, 0.3) when no noise is used. Preventing such attacks for non-minimax filters requires a
significant amount of additive noise (e.g., −1≥0.1) which destroys the utility of data. These
results show that differentially privacy is indeed different from privacy against inference
attacks and the combination of two methods is beneficial.
7. Conclusion
This work presents a new learning-based mechanism for preventing inference attacks on
continuous and high-dimensional data. In this mechanism, a filter transforms continuous
and high-dimensional raw features to dimensionality-reduced representations of data. After
filtering, information on target tasks remains but information on identifying or sensitive
attributes is removed which makes it difficult for an adversary to accurately infer such
attributes from the released filtered output. Minimax filters are designed to achieve the
optimal utility-privacy tradeoff in terms of expected risks. The paper proves that a filter
learned from empirical risks is not far from an ideal filter that is learned from expected risks
as the number of samples increases. This property and its dependency on the task make
this mechanism quite different from previous mechanisms, including syntactic anonymiza-
tion and differential privacy. Algorithms for finding minimax filters are presented and
evaluated on real-world data sets to show its practical usages. Experiments show that pub-
licly available multisubject data sets are surprisingly susceptible to subject identification
attacks, and that even simple linear minimax filters can reduce the privacy risks close to
chance level without sacrificing target task accuracy by much.
This work also presents preprocessing and postprocessing approaches to combine min-
imax privacy and differential privacy. While differential privacy has become a popular
criterion of privacy loss, it is not without limitations, in particular against inference attacks
as empirically demonstrated in the paper. This leaves room for development of new mech-
anisms such as the noisy minimax filter presented in the paper, which aims to achieve high
on-average utility and protection against inference attacks, and a formal privacy guarantee
to a degree. The results from experiments encourage further research on potential benefits
of combining different notions and mechanisms of privacy, which is left as future work.
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Figure 8: The full result of the performance noisy filters (PCA-pre/post and Minimax-
pre/post) on the accuracy of target and private tasks on three data sets: GENKI
(1st & 2nd row), ENTERFACE (3rd & 4th row), HAR (5th & 6th row).
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